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ACQUIESCENCE, OBJECTION AND THE DEATH
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
DAVID J. BEDERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati have offered1 a carefully argued and
nuanced approach to a central dilemma in international legal theory: once
constituted, can customary international law (“CIL”) norms ever be
supplanted? As tempting as it might be to weigh-in on the intellectual and
doctrinal history of what Bradley and Gulati refer to as the “Mandatory
View”—that States may not unilaterally withdraw from CIL rules once
such rules are formed2—my contribution here focuses on two, related
claims made by Bradley and Gulati and their normative implications.
Bradley and Gulati’s first claim has to do with a crucial feature of the birth
of CIL: the ability of States as persistent objectors to block the formation of
custom. The second claim refutes the possibility that, once birthed, CIL
cannot—under the Mandatory View—ever really die. Both these claims
require further elaboration and qualification.
I. PERSISTENT OBJECTION
Bradley and Gulati’s first claim is that there is an apparent disconnect
in international legal theory which allows States to unilaterally opt-out of
the formation of a rule as CIL, but, once “crystalized,” that norm cannot be
subsequently violated. This is known as the “persistent objector” rule.
Bradley and Gulati ask whether the rule was really intended to be an
exception to the Mandatory View and thus whether the rule has obscured
the possibility that international actors have, in fact, embraced a “Default

* K.H. Gyr Professor of Private International Law, Emory University. This contribution is
partially drawn from chapter 11 of my forthcoming book, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW (Cambridge
University Press, 2010). I profited from participation in the Duke Law School Center for International
and Comparative Law Scholarly Roundtable on “Opting Out of Customary International Law,” held on
January 30, 2010.
1. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J.
202 (2010).
2. See id. at 204-05 (describing the “Mandatory View”), 215-26 (discussing historical support for
the Mandatory View).
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View,” allowing States to opt-out of a CIL norm with sufficient notice and
expectation safeguards.3 In large measure this debate turns on the proper
reading of a number of canonical decisions issued by the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the mid-twentieth century.4 This was just the
time (Bradley and Gulati argue5) that the Mandatory View was stealthily
supplanting the Default View.
The first of these, The Asylum Case,6 implicated a most peculiar
custom. The case arose when a Peruvian military leader, Victor Raul Haya
de la Torre, took refuge in the Colombian embassy in Lima after leading an
unsuccessful coup attempt. Elsewhere in the world, this would have
resulted in a very long stay for Haya de la Torre. For while all nations
respect the inviolability of foreign embassy premises, there is certainly no
rule requiring a host State to allow a political refugee safe passage out of
the embassy, out of the country, and to the asylum State. Nowhere, that is,
except Latin America, where there evolved a regional custom of diplomatic
asylum.
Imagine, then, the surprise of the Colombian authorities, who, after
waiting a few months, made what they assumed was a pro forma request to
Peru to grant Haya de la Torre safe passage to Colombia. The Peruvians
turned them down, asserting that they were not bound by the regional
custom of diplomatic asylum. The Court ultimately took Peru’s side in the
dispute, ruling that the regional custom was not binding.7 Once it became
clear that Colombia bore the burden of showing that Peru’s conduct
violated international law (as opposed to Peru being required to explain its
actions), the result was inevitable.
The most significant aspects of this case were the ICJ’s treatment of a
State’s reaction as proof of its opposition to the formation of a custom and
its discounting of regional custom as a source of international law. The
Court ruled that where a regional (as distinct from a global) custom was
concerned, silence on the part of the State in the face of an emerging
practice meant that that State objected or protested to the rule. A silent or
ambiguous response meant rejection. This ran counter to the general

3. See id. at 232, 239-41.
4. See id. at 233-34 (discussing the Asylum and Fisheries cases).
5. See id. at 233.
6. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).
7. See Herbert W. Briggs, The Colombian-Peruvian Case and Proof of Customary International
Law, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 708, 728–731 (1951); ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 246-54 (1971); SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, The DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 374-77, 380 (1958); H.W.A. THIRLWAY,
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 100-03, 136-37 (1972).

BEDERMAN_FMT3.DOC

2010]

1/7/2011 1:30:38 PM

THE DEATH OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

33

presumption in international law that States were obliged to protest loud
and often if they wished to avoid being bound by a rule of emerging global
custom.
Why, then, did the World Court change the calculus of consent for
regional custom in the Asylum Case? One can only conclude that the Court
wished to suppress regional custom, and the Court found that there was no
more effective way to do so than to declare a presumption that
fundamentally disrupts the formation of such regional practices. While the
ICJ has no qualms about applying rules derived from regional (or at least
non-global) treaties, it was concerned that the development of distinctive
bodies of regional rules—perhaps not just for Latin America, but also for
Europe, Africa and Asia—might unduly interfere with the universal
aspirations of international law. The World Court was worried such easyto-make rules would significantly diminish its power. This is evident in
light of an analytically similar case, Right of Passage over Indian Territory,
decided by the Court in 1960,8 the ICJ reached a very different conclusion.
The problem raised in that dispute was Portugal’s asserted right to
transit both civil administrators, troops and munitions from the Portuguese
colony of Goa (on the coast of India) to little Portuguese-controlled
enclaves in India’s interior. This dispute arose in the late 1950s—a critical
time for the process of decolonization around the world—and India did not
hide its desire to drive the last vestiges of colonialism from the Indian
subcontinent. The Indian authorities denied Portugal’s right of passage,
assuming (correctly) that if the enclaves could not be re-supplied, they
would be ripe for the picking.
The ICJ could have decided the dispute as a matter of global custom:
whether there was some inherent right of passage by one nation over the
territory of another, especially in situations where one nation’s territory
completely surrounded another’s. The Court declined to undertake this
analysis, however, and one can hardly blame them. Such an analysis would
have been a daunting and difficult task; it would have required collecting
many centuries of State practice over many continents, in order to derive a
set of global customary rules for these situations.
Instead, the World Court chose to limit the scope of the analysis to an
exceedingly narrow shutter. The ICJ decided to tackle the question of
whether Portugal and India (and its predecessors, the British and Maratha
rulers) had developed a special, or local, custom allowing Portuguese right
of passage. The Court sifted through evidence of the course of dealing
between the two sides over the course of many centuries. The ICJ
8. Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12).
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ultimately concluded that Portugal’s right of passage for civil
administrators was binding custom on India, although India retained the
right to suspend such passage in exceptional circumstances. But as for a
right to move troops and weapons over Indian territory, previous
permissions to do so had been “mere” comity or courtesy, and in so lacking
opinio juris it failed as a custom.9
In Right of Passage and its 1952 Nationals in Morocco opinion,10 the
Court essentially decided that it was futile to declare a global custom in a
case where it was easier to describe and characterize an ongoing practice
between the two disputing parties. And, in using a special custom—which
can be analogized to commercial usages and “course of dealing”—the
Court resorted to the typical presumption that silence in the face of an
emerging practice means acquiescence or acceptance. In these bilateral
situations, it appears especially incumbent on States to protest if they are
unhappy with the legal positions taken by their neighbors.
For example, in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,11 the
United Kingdom and Norway contested access to fisheries off the
Norwegian coast. Norway had attempted to claim ocean areas through
some creative cartography: by drawing “straight baselines” from points
along its rugged coastline and asserting that the enclosed areas were
exclusive Norwegian fisheries. Norway’s zealous “bidding” of a straightbaseline rule, combined with Britain’s lack of effective (and welldocumented) protests in the early-1900s, meant that Britain had waived its
subsequent objection.12 The Court indicated that Norway’s straight-baseline
rule was thus not “opposable” by the U.K.
If one regards this pattern of ICJ rulings about the formation of
customary international law as troublesome (as Bradley and Gulati do13),
one would be correct to be concerned—but not for the reasons that Bradley
and Gulati express. The persistent objector cases do appear to support, at
least implicitly, the existence of the Mandatory View. It would seem that,
with the exception of regional custom, fortune favors those States that
aggressively stake-out new rules and hope that other nations simply do not
notice or fail to act in a timely or compelling manner. Why else have a

9. See D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 256–58; THIRLWAY, supra note 7, at 138–39.
10. Right of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (U.S. v. Fr.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 199–200
(Aug. 27) (specifically referring to “local custom”). See also D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 254-55;
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7, at 388-92; THIRLWAY, supra note 7, at 92-94.
11. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
12. See D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 258–62; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7, at 368-70; I.C.
MACGIBBON, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115, 134 (1957).
13. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 232, 237-41.
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persistent objector rule, other than as a signaling device that the time for
unilateral opposition to a CIL norm has passed? Despite criticism, the
persistent objector rule is likely to remain a robust feature in the
development of CIL.
II. IS INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM IMMORTAL?
That leaves the question of how States can effectively “opt-out,” or
block the application of a customary rule. While the formation of
customary obligations can be foiled by a lack of duration or consensus in
State practice, or the occasional denial of opinio juris, once a usage has
gained momentum it is hard to stop. The general presumption is that, unless
a State has persistently objected during the process of crystalizing a
customary norm, it will be held to that rule, even if it later regrets or
denounces the norm in question.14 Indeed, Bradley and Gulati go so far as
to assert that “[t]he only way for nations to change a rule of CIL (as
opposed to overriding it by treaty) is to violate the rule and hope that other
nations accept the new practice.”15
I call this the “Walking Dead View” of CIL, and it is perhaps the
decisive feature of the customary regime in international law. It means that
States are obliged to protest loud and often if they wish to avoid being
bound by a norm of emerging global custom. Subsequent objections to an
already-formed custom are likely to be ineffective, and the only way for a
State to liberate itself from a CIL obligation is to demonstrate that that
norm has been superseded or entered desuetude.16 But it is worth observing
that, with the exception of the acquiescence of coordinate branches of
government in constitutional separation-of-powers disputes, in no other
14. Compare Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of
Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 21 (1985) (“the persistent objector rule has no
legitimate basis in the international legal system”), with Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of
Customary International Law, 272 RECUEILS DES COURS DE L’ACADEMIE DROIT INT’L [Collected
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law] [hereinafter RCADI] 155, 227–44 (1998-II)
(arguing that the persistent objector rule has substantial authority from international precedents) and
Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of Persistent Objection in
International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457 (1985). See also BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 229-42 (2010). For the origins
of the persistent objector rule in academic literature, see Olufemi Elias, Some Remarks on the Persistent
Objector Rule in Customary International Law, 1991 DENNING L.J. 37 (tracing it to the writings of Ian
Brownlie).
15. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 212.
16. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 63 (CIL “cannot
. . . be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any [State] in its own
favour”). See also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115,
170-71 (2005); MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 36–37 (rev. 2d
ed. 1997).
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domain of customary law is persistent objection, by a particular actor in a
legal community, entertained as a ground for refusing to enforce a
custom.17 Public international law thus has two peculiar features for
customary norms: they may be objected to by a vociferous minority, but,
once acceded to, they may not (apparently) be breached, except in the
absence of a new rule.
The structure of customary law is thus skewed in favor of rule
formation, at least once a threshold has been crossed. Persistent objection
can thus be difficult to sustain.18 As the International Law Association has
reported, the persistent objector rule
respects States’ sovereignty and protects them from having new law
imposed on them against their will by a majority; but at the same time,
if the support for the new rule is sufficiently widespread, the convoy of
the law’s progressive development can move forward without having
to wait for the slowest vessel.19

Tribunals will occasionally allow States to silently abstain from a
usage (or to substitute another rule). If other interested nations themselves
fail to object, this lack of “opposability” might have the same effect as a
successful persistent objection.20 But this is a strategy fraught with risk, and
the dynamic of tacit acceptance and persistent objection best describes the
formation of CIL.
All this leads to broader—and even more intractable—problems of
how a norm of CIL, once formed, later is modified or terminated in
application or effect. Put simply, how can there be desuetudo for custom
(consuetudo)?21 One myth—perpetuated by Bradley and Gulati—is that,
once born, a norm of customary international law can never die.22 But this

17. See also J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
449, 511-12 (2000).
18. See KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-67 (2d rev. ed. 1993).
19. Int’l Law Ass’n, Committee on Formation of Customary International Law, Statement of
Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law: Report of the SixtyNinth Conference, London, Section II.C.15, Comment (c) (July 25-29, 2000).
20. See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18) (the
delimitation rule “would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway, in as much as she has always
opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast”). See also Michael Akehurst, Custom as a
Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 23–27 (1974–75); G.M. DANILENKO, LAWMAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 109-13 (1993).
21. See E. Jiménez de Aréchega, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RCADI 1,
21 (1978-I); D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 239-40.
22. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 212; see also G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1983).
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is “a wholly erroneous belief,”23 and it is refuted in State practice. Custom
does evolve over time. The opposite line of argument is that every act
contrary to an existing custom “contains the seeds of a new legality,” and
that “each deviation contains the seeds of a new rule.”24 Indeed, the ICJ in
the 1986 Nicaragua Judgment seemed to sanction this approach. It
observed that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a particular
customary norm could be treated not only as “breaches” of the rule, but
also “indications of the recognition of a new rule.”25 In this Freudian
construct, every aberrant usage really is a “bid” for a new custom. But
sometimes a violation of a CIL norm is just that—an unlawful act that does
not really purport to establish a new rule.26 Similarly, it surely cannot be
enough for States to unilaterally declare that a custom is no longer real or
binding.27
To unwind an existing custom, it must no longer be constituted by its
essential ingredients—there must be a contrary State practice, and the old
norm must no longer be supported by opinio juris.28 This more nuanced
stance also has support in the Nicaragua Judgment, when the Court noted
that “[r]eliance by a state on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to
the principle might, if shared in principle by other states, tend towards a
modification of customary international law.”29 This may, however, beg the
question whether “a lack of state practice consistent with [a norm,] rather
than directly contrary practice”30 triggers desuetude for a custom. There is a
split among publicists as to whether, in order to complete the process of
desuetude, the old custom must be entirely supplanted by a new one. Some
authorities insist this must be so, if for no other reason than to avoid
lacunae in CIL.31 But others argue that “the evidence of the absence of
general consensus in respect of a customary rule causes its disappearance
even before the replacing customary rule has matured.”32

23. Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary
International Law and Some of its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 531 (2004).
24. VAN HOOF, supra note 22, at 99 n.379.
25. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27).
26. See WOLFKE, supra note 18, at 65–66.
27. See Akehurst, supra note 20, at 8.
28. See VILLIGER, supra note 16, at 55.
29. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 207.
30. LEPARD, supra note 14, at 279 (original emphasis).
31. See Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Elements of Custom and the Hague Court, 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 810, 846 (1971) (F.R.G.).
32. Aréchaga, supra note 21, at 21; see also Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951
I.C.J. 116, 148 (Dec. 18) (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez) (“[A] new case strongly stated may be
sufficient to render obsolete an ancient custom.”).
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Despite these disagreements, one can accept the notion that existing
customs should not be lightly discarded. Indeed, there should be a higher
threshold of uniformity, consistency and volume of State practice in order
to terminate “an old, well-settled customary rule,”33 as opposed to creating
a new one in a hitherto unregulated realm of international relations.
One can be agnostic in regard to these questions, but still believe, as
Judge Jiménez de Aréchega noted in his separate opinion in the 1982
Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, that it cannot be enough to subvert
an existing custom by vague or inchoate statements34—“in order to have
this abrogating effect the new rule must necessarily partake of the nature of
a rule of customary law . . . . Only a legal rule may abrogate a preexisting
one.”35 This statement was clearly intended as a complement to Kelsen’s
assertion that “[i]f a substantial number of states repeatedly and effectively
violate a rule of custom, and particularly do so with the conviction that they
are creating new law, it is difficult to maintain that the old law remains
unimpaired.”36
For an existing custom to enter desuetude, patterns of State practice
really must change or there must be very clear evidence that the usage is no
longer “accepted as law.” Put another way, there are two ways to kill a
norm of customary international law: divert the course of State practice, or
deprive the rule of its legitimacy via opinio juris.37 Unlike Bradley and
Gulati, I strongly believe that CIL can and should evolve, and that, by no
means, are CIL rules immortal.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING CUSTOM
To their immense credit, Professors Bradley and Gulati confine their
analysis of the problem of withdrawal from CIL to a prescriptive antidote
rather than a broad attack on the very nature of international custom itself.38
This is just as well, because of all the contemporary challenges to
customary international law, the line of inquiry which suggests that CIL
can never be a “real” source of international legal obligation can be most
33. WOLFKE, supra note 18, at 65.
34. See Akehurst, supra note 20, at 8 (explaining that CIL can be altered simply “by repeatedly
declaring that the old rule no longer exists”).
35. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 115 (Feb. 24) (separate opinion of Judge
Aréchaga).
36. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 454 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed.
1966).
37. But see VAN HOOF, supra note 22, at 101 (arguing that only changes in opinio juris can
effectuate modifications of CIL).
38. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 208 (“[O]ur goal is not to challenge CIL’s legitimacy,
but rather to better understand how it should work.”).
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readily dispensed with. Although most recently popularized in the work of
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner,39 this critique of CIL obviously has, as its
intellectual roots,40 Hans Kelsen’s and H.L.A. Hart’s two-edged attack on
international law. Kelsen and Hart famously argued that, to the extent that
custom plays any role in international legal obligation, it is a sign of a
“premature” legal order,41 and, even worse, a thinly-disguised natural law
vision based on inchoate notions of “international morality.”42 CIL really
is, however, an intensely positivist construct. It is far from being a
“subordinate”43 source of international legal obligation and actually quite
central to current doctrinal debates.
Goldsmith and Posner take a very different methodological tack, but
their provisional conclusion is still the same as Kelsen’s and Hart’s:44 that
States have no real obligation to follow CIL rules. Using rational choice
and game theory approaches,45 Goldsmith and Posner posit four models of
behavioral compliance with customary international law norms:
coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation, and coordination.
Coincidence occurs when States follow a norm irrespective of the behavior
of other nations.46 Coercion occurs when strong States force weak nations
to comply.47 Cooperation and coordination occur when States, out of pure
self-interest and the expectation of reciprocity, observe a rule.48 In none of
these situations, Goldsmith and Posner assert, do States follow such norms
according to a sense of legal obligation.49 To some degree, Bradley and
Gulati share this view.50
The flaw in this contention is not so much the game-theoretic
perspective (which may well describe the dynamic of some State

39. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-28
(2005).
40. For an intellectual history, see D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 23-29; LEPARD, supra note 14, at
14-15, 99-100.
41. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 44–47 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d
ed. 1994); KELSEN, supra note 36, at 440–43.
42. See HART, supra note 41, at 219–32; see also KELSEN, supra note 36, at 444-45.
43. HART, supra note 41, at 45.
44. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 225-26.
45. See id. at 26–27. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 56067 (2002).
46. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 27-28.
47. See id. at 28–29.
48. See id. at 29–35 (distinguishing “cooperation” as a bilateral, “single-play” Prisoner’s Dilemma
from “coordination” as multilateral, “repeated-play” scenarios).
49. See id. at 39.
50. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 210-11.
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behaviors),51 but its fundamental assumption as to why States obey
international law.52 Using a hyperactively realist perspective of
international relations,53 Goldsmith and Posner conclude that
“[m]ainstream international law scholars would not view a behavioral
regularity that arises from” their four models “as an example of customary
international law.”54 For Goldsmith and Posner, to follow a CIL norm
because of its inherent value (coincidence), or out of self-interest
(cooperation and coordination), or even because of fear of negative
consequences (coercion), is inimical with it being a legal rule.
That conclusion ignores the rich experience of functional cooperation
in the international community. Whether one views functionalism in the
sense of expected reciprocities for behavior, or through a wider lens, one
must realize that while a State’s compliance with a norm may begin with
expectation, apathy, or (even) fear, it ultimately ends with the certainty of
legal duty. Functional cooperation between States and international actors
is conditioned largely by forces that may have little to do with law. These
forces might include: developments in the international economy;
movements of people, goods and services; and the globalization of culture
and intellectual life.55 The phenomenon of functional legal cooperation
between States has been overwhelmingly responsive or reactionary.
International law has acknowledged the demands of international life,
rather than anticipating or directing them. That is not entirely a bad
circumstance; some of the signal failings of international law have arisen
when lawyers and diplomats have moved ahead of the needs of the
international community. International law is doctrinally most vulnerable—
and most illegitimate—when it loses touch with its constituencies and
function. Therefore, Goldsmith’s and Posner’s belief that a schism should
exist between the “true” motivations of States in obeying CIL and their
sense of legal obligation is no criticism at all. Put another way, one can be
instrumental about the role of CIL in international relations,56 without

51. For a review of the game theoretic implications of Goldsmith’s and Posner’s work, see
generally George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 541 (2005); Swaine, supra note 45, at 573–88.
52. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997); Swaine, supra note 45, at 588-92.
53. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1875-76 (2002).
54. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 38.
55. For more on these phenomena, see DAVID J. BEDERMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008).
56. Goldsmith and Posner refer to theirs as an “instrumental theory.” See GOLDSMITH & POSNER,
supra note 39, at 185.
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falling into the realist trap that disclaims any proof of norm-compliance as
evidence of an international legal obligation.
However, just because customary international law easily escapes the
clutches of the realist critique does not make it immune from other charges.
Standard accounts of customary law—including CIL—laud its efficiency
and nimbleness in incorporating into a legal system the actual behaviors
and expectations of that system’s constituents. Custom remains a powerful,
if subliminal, source of law, even in “mature” legal systems. But public
international law is not a fully mature legal system at all—aspects of it
remain strikingly primitive, though only in the sense that public
international is highly decentralized and institutionally undeveloped, not
ineffective or unsophisticated).57 Furthermore, customary international law
is supposedly a source of signal strength and flexibility for international
law.58 It allows international legal actors to informally develop rules of
behavior, without the necessity of resorting to more formal and difficult
means of law-making (like treaties). Custom “tracks” or follows the
conduct of States, international institutions, transnational business
organizations, religious and civic groups, individuals involved in
international matters, and many other actors.59 These functional aspects of
CIL appear to have been overlooked by Bradley and Gulati.
Indeed, CIL’s ostensible efficiency appears to have been a primary
motivation for its incorporation into the ICJ’s Statute Article 38’s
formulation of the sources of international law. As Baron Descamps,
President of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, noted in 1920: CIL is “a
very natural and extremely reliable method of development [of
international law] since it results entirely from the constant expression of
the legal convictions and of the needs of the nations in their mutual
intercourse.”60 But efficiency and “reliab[ility]” may have two very
different meanings here. The extent to which CIL effectively tracks State

57. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94-95 (2002); see generally A.I.L.
Campbell, International Law and Primitive Law, 8 O.J.L.S. 169 (1988) and Yoram Dinstein,
International Law as a Primitive Legal System, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (1986).
58. See R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RCADI 25, 42, 96 (1970) (Neth.); David Fidler,
Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom, 1996 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 198, 220-24 (describing CIL as
a “dynamo”); LEPARD, supra note 14, at 371-79; Julius Stone, On the Vocation of the International Law
Commission, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 21, 32 (1957) (explaining that CIL is superior to codification).
59. For the development of CIL by individuals, NGOs, and members of international “civil
society,” see Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law Formation, 48 VA. J.
INT’L L. 119 (2007).
60. See Baron Descamps, Address Before the Advisory Committee of Jurists (July 2, 1920), in
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS, PROCÈSVERBAUX OF THE COMMITTEE, June-July 1920, at 322.
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behavior (the sense that Descamps employed) is a very different inquiry
than whether a particular customary norm is rational or reasonable.61
Some scholars have inferred that CIL is more forgiving in embracing
unreasonable norms than any realm of domestic law, public or private,62
where irrational customs are routinely struck by judges. Many of the
factors that tend towards the promotion of efficient customs are notably
absent in international relations.63 These are, most particularly, the lack of
homogeneity among States in the international community and the
unlikelihood that States will play reciprocal roles on most contentious
issues. Such a reciprocal relation occurs when international actors find
themselves routinely on both sides of the problem, such as being both
buyers and sellers in a commercial transaction. 64 Nevertheless, CIL norms
are most likely to flourish precisely in the interstices of international
relations, where States have homogenous objectives and are likely to
appreciate both sides of an issue in relatively non-contentious
circumstances.65 While it may well be true that there is no prohibition on
CIL’s incorporation of irrational norms, such is a highly unlikely
occurrence.
The refutation of these critiques of CIL may beg the larger
implications of the efficiency paradox for CIL. On this issue, Goldsmith’s
and Posner’s critique hits closer to the mark, and their conclusions are
amplified by Professors Bradley and Gulati.66 “Multilateral coordination
problems,” Goldsmith and Posner argue, cannot “easily be solved in the
informal, unstructured, and decentralized manner typically associated with
customary international law.”67 This, of course, converts CIL’s supposed
signal strengths—its informal, unstructured and decentralized character—
into fatal flaws. But in an international legal system which already features

61. See Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 93, 122–23 (2003); Norman & Trachtman, supra note 51, at 554–55.
62. See Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
859, 877-96 (2006).
63. Some factors are present, such as the (relatively) small number of States (about 190 today),
and the likelihood (at least for some issues) of a high number of repeat transactions. See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 84, 178-81 (1991).
64. See id. at 54; Kontorovich, supra note 62, at 893–94.
65. See Kontorovich, supra note 62, at 916-17 (discussing CIL of diplomatic privileges and
immunities as being paradigmatic of this phenomenon), 917-20 (examining laws of war and human
rights, and concluding that these realms are unlikely to find equilibrium with efficient customs because
of a lack of reciprocity and mutuality); see also Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by
Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1373-74 (1997) (explaining that homogenous groups
use custom as a way to avoid hold-out problems by individuals).
66. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 239-46.
67. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 37.
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many highly-structured mechanisms for law-creation (such as functional
international institutions, the International Law Commission, and treatydrafting or treaty-review diplomatic conferences), it certainly makes sense
that there should also be an alternative set of processes for CIL formation
The dynamic of State practice and CIL offers the best hope for such an
alternative to the glacial pace of treaty-making and sclerotic attempts at
treaty enforcement,68 application, and compliance.
At a time when customary international law is under attack by both
extreme positivists (who suggest that its processes are illegitimate and nontransparent69) and those of a naturalist bent (who regard CIL as merely
pandering to State interests70), it might be useful to recall that in some ways
custom is the most positive and progressive of international law sources.
CIL is certainly the most likely to track (although, I concede, a bit
inelastically as Bradley and Gulati suggest)71 the actual behavior of
international actors. The market aspect of customary norm-creation largely
ensures that. Moreover, as Anthony D’Amato has observed, “[c]ustom is a
dynamic process of law-creation, yet it is also a restraint on illegal
dynamism.”72 So, any view of CIL “must provide for change and
adaptation in customary law, yet it must also ensure enough stability. . . .”73
Reports of the imminent demise of customary international law, which
have been circulating for decades,74 thus seem premature. It is highly
unlikely that the treaty-making process in international law will ever

68. See Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 573
(2005); Bethany Lukitsch Hicks, Treaty Congestion in International Environmental Law: The Need for
Greater International Coordination, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1643 (1999); Edith Brown Weiss,
International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81
GEO. L.J. 675, 697–702 (1993).
69. See N.C.H. Dunbar, The Myth of Customary International Law, 8 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1
(1983); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1113, 1120-39 (1999).
70. See Fidler, supra note 58, at 234-48; John Tasioulas, Customary international law and the
quest for global justice, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 307, 313-20 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine
& James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007).
71. For the academic literature on custom’s “stickiness” or lack of responsiveness of new norms,
see Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
651 (2006); Victor Flesicher, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 91-92 (2005); see also
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 245-49.
72. D’AMATO, supra note 7, at 12.
73. Id.
74. See ROBERT JENNINGS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 65–67
(1986); Kelly, supra note 17, at 537 (any “perceived advantages [of retaining CIL] are not only illusory,
but are more than offset by significant disadvantages.”); VAN HOOF, supra note 22, at 114-16; CHARLES
DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (P.E. Corbett trans., 1957).
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completely supplant CIL,75 even though (admittedly) more and more areas
subject to exclusively customary regulation will be codified over time.
Furthermore, codification is not an “end of history” for customary
international law. Codification merely shifts CIL to a new ground of treaty
construction and application, as well as the potential for new customary
norms to emerge.
CONCLUSION
The crucial challenge for customary international law is to, at once,
retain its dynamism and its legitimacy.76 As I have tried to argue here, the
traditional formula for CIL enshrined in ICJ Statute Article 3877 is not a
musty formalism or some artifact from the deep recesses of international
law’s intellectual history. Rather, the combined objective and subjective
inquiries for CIL formation (state practice and opinio juris) remain the
crucial algorithm for establishing whether a norm really rises to the level of
international custom, and is thus deserving of recognition and enforcement.
To dispense with, or relax, either of these requirements, in a misguided
attempt to increase CIL’s dynamism and relevance (especially to pursue
favored objectives, such as the promotion of human rights), would fatally
undermine its legitimacy. Likewise, to abandon customary international
law’s strong positivist intellectual roots in favor of a new naturalism
(whether expressed in the idiom of the “rationality” or “humanity” of
favored norms), would also be folly.
Within these theoretical limitations, I favor an approach to customary
international law that emphasizes its diverse and robust (even combative)
character. The processes of customary international law work best when all
international actors realize that there is much at stake. That is why I argue
here for the continued embrace of the tacit acceptance (through
acquiescence) of emerging CIL norms, so long as the privileged place of
the persistent objector is recognized. This should apply to manifestations of
global custom, as well as special or local custom, but not for regional
custom. Just as we should remove structural impediments to the formation
of CIL (even while rigorously observing the requirements of State practice
and opinio juris), symmetry and legitimacy demands that the same process
should be able to ratchet in reverse. Those norms that have outlived their
usefulness, and are no longer supported by either constituent ingredient for
75. See Kelly, supra note 17, at 538-42 (arguing that treaties provide a complete alternative to
CIL).
76. See Fidler, supra note 58, at 220-24.
77. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
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CIL, should be accorded a decent burial. If this approach is followed, there
will be no need to have recourse to Professor Bradley’s and Gulati’s
proposed “return” to the Default Rule for withdrawing from international
custom.

